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Abstract 
 
Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting 
from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the 
mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases 
actually undertaken. Using a database containing 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French 
firms over the period 2000-2002, we show that very few firms fully comply with the 
regulations for all their buybacks. Non-compliance has an adverse effect on liquidity only for 
the smallest and least liquid firms.  
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Over the last decade, open market share repurchase has become a major corporate payout 
mechanism for public corporations all around the world (see for example Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004, for the U.S., Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000 for Canada and 
Rau and Vermaelen, 2002, for the UK). To implement these buybacks, managers act directly 
in the market as investors on behalf of the company. This action puts them in the position of 
insiders, and thus, their intervention can be costly for investors. For the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange, Brockman and Chung (2001) find that managers exhibit timing ability and that 
liquidity deteriorates during repurchase periods. To limit the risk of improper intervention, 
most countries have regulations for share repurchases to ensure that its shareholder interests 
are protected, and that the company will not profit from its private information. For instance, 
repurchases are not allowed when management holds information not disclosed to the market. 
There are also regulations to prevent manipulation of stock prices, which can arise when the 
company has contracts containing optional provisions that depend on share prices. This type 
of clause is common in mergers and acquisitions, LBOs and management remuneration 
packages. Restrictions on the quantity of shares repurchased during a given trading day 
reduce the impact of repurchases on the market price, but it is difficult to determine the level 
of compliance with these restrictions. The objective of this paper is to assess regulatory 
compliance in France, where repurchase disclosure is mandatory. 
Regulation of share repurchases is an element of a more general trend to eliminate illegal 
insider trading, when managers, directors, or major shareholders buy or sell shares and are the 
sole beneficiaries of the transactions. In share repurchases, the decision is made by 
management, but on behalf of the company. Most developed countries have introduced 
insider trading regulations (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002 and Durnev and Nain, 2005) and 
there are studies that examine their effectiveness.
1 
While detailed regulations have also been established for share repurchases, there are few 
studies that have analyzed actual compliance with the rules.
2 Companies’ disclosures of their 
total buybacks provide the only basis for verification of compliance, and disclosure 
requirements vary widely between countries and periods.
3 
Until 2004, the country with the most lenient regulations was the United States. Firms 
could repurchase shares without prior announcement and announce buyback programs 
without fulfilling them. The only disclosure requirement for repurchases was the reporting of 
the number of shares outstanding at quarter-end. The only guide for executing open market  
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repurchases was SEC safe harbor Rule 10b-18 under the Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10b-18 
provides issuers with a "safe harbor" from liability for manipulation when they repurchase 
their common stock in the market in accordance with the rule's manner, timing, price, and 
volume conditions. Prior to December 2003, when the SEC adopted amendments to Rule 10b-
18, requiring companies to disclose all repurchases, the SEC had no means of investigating 
10b-18 compliance for U.S. firms. Given the absence of regulatory based data, Cook, 
Krigman and Leach (2003) investigate 10b-18 compliance by using voluntarily disclosed data 
for 54 firms' repurchase programs during 1993 and 1994. They document that only 2 of the 54 
firms were verifiably in compliance with the safe harbor guidelines for all reported 
repurchases. Since their sample contains only voluntarily supplied information, their results 
imply that few U.S. public firms complied totally with Rule 10b-18, prior to the enactment of 
the disclosure amendments.  
In Europe, open market share repurchases are a recent practice that has been accompanied 
from the outset by regulations requiring actual repurchases to be reported at the time of the 
event. Under a European Union (EU) directive that took effect in 2004, national repurchase 
regulations are now tending to converge. 
French regulations are similar to U.S. Rule 10b-18 in many respects, but firms listed on 
Paris Stock Exchange are required to disclose repurchases made during a given month at the 
beginning of the following month.
4 The information disclosed to the regulators states only the 
number of repurchased shares for the whole month, but we also obtained a previously unused 
database of repurchases from the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), an organization 
that has the same role as the SEC in the U.S. This database includes the trading dates, the 
number of shares acquired and the price paid per share. Thus it is possible to analyze the level 
of compliance with current repurchase regulations for all repurchases, avoiding the self-
selection bias inherent to voluntarily disclosed survey data. Given the similarities of French 
repurchase regulations to U.S. regulations and empirical results, our data have implications 
for projecting the effects of the 2004 amendments in the U.S. French regulators have also 
initiated several investigations and lawsuits against companies and their management. A well-
known case concerned the massive stock repurchases by Vivendi just after September 11, 
2001.
5 These buybacks did not comply with the volume restriction specified in French 
repurchase regulations, and also took place during the 15 days prior to publication of the 
company’s half-yearly results, a prohibited period. These activities resulted in a legal inquiry 
that led to executives being placed under investigation, an indication that non-compliance 
with share repurchase regulations is a risky strategy for management.   
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In this paper, we analyze French businesses’ compliance with the main share repurchase 
rules. Using data from Euronext Paris (the Paris Stock Exchange), we study repurchase 
regulation compliance on the Paris Stock Exchange for 806 repurchase programs and 36,848 
repurchase trading days over the period 2000-2002. First, we examine whether the companies 
comply with the maximum repurchase price and the maximum percentage of capital for 
repurchase, as established by shareholders at the annual meeting. We show that most firms 
comply with these constraints. We also observe that most firms set limits that are greater than 
the requirements for their share repurchase programs. The few violations we find relate to 
companies that set limits that are stricter than the average.  
We then study two of the main features of French share repurchase regulations, a limit on 
volume (repurchases must not exceed 25% of the reference volume for each trading day), and 
a rule prohibiting repurchases during the 15 days preceding publication of earnings results. 
We find that 79% of firms violate the volume rule in at least one repurchase day over the 
period 2000-2002, and 69% break the rule for more than 5% of repurchase days. This finding 
primarily applies to the smallest and least liquid firms. Only 13.89% of CAC40 companies 
break the rule for more than 5% of repurchase days. 70% of repurchasing companies bought 
back stock at least once during a non-trading window, just before announcing their results, 
and this non-compliance covers a total of 5.64% of repurchase trading days. We conclude that 
French publicly traded companies do not always comply with share repurchase regulations, 
and that violations are particularly frequent for companies listed on the cash-only market. 
We then address related issues including whether there are negative consequences of rule 
violations on equity market liquidity. We analyze the differing impact of repurchases on 
market liquidity, according to their compliance or non-compliance with regulations and show 
that firms listed on the cash-only market, which are responsible for most of the regulation 
violations, are also the companies whose liquidity is most adversely affected by these 
violations. For companies on the more liquid market segments of the exchange, non-
compliance with regulations appears to have little impact on liquidity. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the repurchase regulation 
environment of the Paris Stock Exchange. In Section 3, we describe the data and 
methodology. The Section 4 analyzes firms’ compliance with the terms of their programs as 
adopted at the general shareholders’ meeting, and external regulations. In the Section 5, we 
measure the consequences of non-compliance on stock liquidity. Section 6 summarizes and 
concludes the paper.  
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2.  Paris repurchase regulation environment  
2.1. Euronext Paris market structure 
 Euronext Paris is an electronic limit order market. There are two major mechanisms for 
trades: one, continuous trading, for the more actively traded stocks, and two, a double auction 
market for the less liquid stocks. A description can be found in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt 
(1999). A call auction determines the opening and closing price in the continuous market. 
Deferred settlement is possible for a subset of the more liquid shares, that is, the market 
segment called the “service à réglement différé” or SRD. For all other shares, only cash 
trading is possible.  
Euronext Paris offers substantial transparency. The five best bid/ask limits (price and 
quantity) in the order book are publicly released and members have access to all orders 
outstanding in the book, although the identity of the broker is not shown. 
Over the period of this study, transactions on a separate regulated block trades market 
were possible only for a small number of shares. Shares listed on the auction market were not 
eligible.
6 An ordinary block could be traded within a price range extended to approximately 
the weighted average price of the five best-price limits. Off-hours transactions are also 
possible for all shares. Transactions made outside the trading hours are executed at a price 
within a range of 1% around the last traded price. 
2.2.   Repurchase regulation environment 
The law of July 2, 1998 authorizes open market stock repurchases up to the limit of 10% 
of capital and over a maximum time period of 18 months. The objectives and terms of the 
open market stock repurchase are defined at the annual general shareholders' meeting. For 
each 24-month period, subject to authorization by shareholders, shares representing up to 10% 
of existing capital can be cancelled. Within the 10% limit, firms can also use the acquired 
shares to grant shares or options to their employees, stabilize stock prices, exchange stocks as 
part of merger and acquisition transactions, reduce or eliminate dilution related to conversion 
of convertible bonds, or hold the shares as treasury stock. Once a French company’s 
repurchase program is approved by the shareholders, a registration statement is issued to 
obtain approval by the AMF. No subsequent announcement of the company’s intention to 
repurchase shares is required before it proceeds with the buybacks.   
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In the U.S., the only guide for executing open market repurchases is the SEC’s "safe 
harbor" Rule 10b-18, which describes a code of conduct that, if followed, protects the 
corporation against share price manipulation charges based on the timing or price of 
repurchases. It is commonly believed by traders, the SEC, and the stock exchanges that the 
safe harbor rule is followed by most repurchasing firms (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003). 
Rule 10b-18 was modified in December 2003. Although French regulations are broadly 
similar to those in the U.S., there are some differences. Table 1 compares French rules, U.S. 
rules until December 2003, and U.S. rules after the 2003 amendments.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
3.  Data 
We use the Euronext intraday database. Our dataset contains a time-stamped record of 
every transaction and order submitted to the market from January 2000 to December 2002 for 
918 French firms. These data include transaction prices, volumes, and the best limits of the 
order book (bid and ask prices, and bid and ask size), as well as market capitalization. All data 
are stamped to the nearest second.  
We also use data from the AMF, which provides daily repurchases made by any firm 
listed on the Paris Stock Exchange from January 2000 to December 2002. The data include 
the name of the repurchasing company, the date, the number of shares repurchased, the share 
price, and the daily total repurchase value. To be retained in the final sample, we require an 
exact reported date for the repurchase, a reported repurchase price higher than the minimum 
and lower than the maximum trading price that day, and a quantity repurchased lower than the 
total quantity traded on the exchange. Our final sample consists of 352 firms and 36,848 
repurchase trading days over the 36-month period of study. 
When a French firm plans to repurchase shares, the shareholders’ meeting must approve 
the terms of the repurchase program, and a registration statement must be issued for the 
program’s approval by the AMF. Repurchases must subsequently respect the terms of the 
repurchase program and comply with repurchase regulations. To examine the compliance of 
repurchases with the program terms, we manually collected all repurchase programs approved 
by the AMF over the period 1998-2002 from data published on the AMF website. A total of 
1,578 repurchase programs were identified. Since repurchase programs can last no longer than  
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18 months, all identified repurchases in the period 2000-2002 belong to one of these 
programs. 
We then identified each repurchase with the relevant authorized program. Of the 36,848 
repurchase days reported for the period 2000-2002, no association with a repurchase program 
could be identified in 1,420 cases, for 40 stocks, covering all repurchases for 13 of those 40. 
Table 2 shows the number of programs and their duration and terms, for the whole sample and 
for subsamples by market (CAC40 index shares, non-CAC40 SRD (deferred settlement 
facilities) shares, cash-only shares).  
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
These data clearly indicate that authorization of a program does not entail a commitment 
to actually repurchase shares. Of the 1,578 programs, 806 (51.08%) are followed by one or 
more buyback transactions. We call these programs active programs. There are 147 programs 
(of which 63.23% are active programs) adopted by CAC40 companies, 365 (of which 52.33% 
are active programs) by non-CAC40 SRD companies, and 1,066 programs (of which 48.97% 
are active programs) by companies belonging to the cash-only market. CAC40 firms 
accounted for 89.13% of the total value repurchased.  
  The distribution of programs by year is stable over time, as is the number of active 
programs. The year 1998, when the law authorizing open market repurchases in France was 
enacted, is an exception. 
  When initially approved by the shareholders, most programs have durations close to 
the maximum, 18 months, since average duration is 17.6 months. However, the true duration 
of a program is shorter, as the adoption of a new program, which generally takes place at the 
annual shareholders’ meeting, cancels the previous program. Given this practice, actual 
duration of French share repurchase programs is 14.14 months on average.  
  The registration statements generally list a number of objectives. We analyze the first 
objective stated by companies, on the hypothesis that objectives are presented in order of 
priority. For 78.9% of the programs, price stabilization is stated as the first objective. The next 
most frequent objectives are to acquire shares for employee stock ownership or option plans 
(7.86%), exchanges of shares, mainly in response to the conversion of convertible bonds 
(6.15%), or for cancellation (5.77%). The largest firms have the most widely-varying 
objectives. For 49.0% of CAC40 companies, price stabilization is their first objective, while 
19.73% name stock grants or options as the first objective and 18.37% list cancellation. On  
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average, 51% of programs are actually implemented, but this proportion rises to 64.83% for 
programs whose primary objective was stock cancellation (and reaches 81.48% for CAC40 
companies’ programs adopted for cancellation).  
In value terms, programs that listed stock price stabilization as the first objective account 
for 46.08% of the value repurchased. The other objectives correspond to lower amounts, with 
cancellation accounting for 16.93% of the total repurchased in terms of value, shares for 
employees 18.44%, and exchanges of shares 17.89%. For smaller non-CAC40 SRD 
companies (cash-only market companies), price stabilization corresponds to 60.19% (64.84%) 
of the value of repurchases.  
 
Table 3 compares the characteristics of firms that have no repurchase program, firms that 
adopt a program but do not implement it over the period, and firms that adopt a program and 
proceed with repurchases at least once over the period studied. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
  Companies that make actual repurchases are the firms largest in market value, are 
involved in the most transactions, are more liquid, and are less volatile than those with no 
repurchase program, or those that adopt a program but do not use it. Their average market 
capitalization is €3,148 million, compared to €348.87 million (€974.52 million) for firms with 
no repurchase program (with an inactive program). The relative spread at opening is 2.31% 
for repurchasing firms, 5.52% for those with no repurchase program, and 3.46% for those 
with an inactive program. The breakdown of the sample shows that the vast majority of 
CAC40 companies (82.6%) repurchase shares at least once over the period. In contrast, 
companies listed on the cash-only market either have no repurchase program (35.5%), or an 
inactive program (29.4%); only 35.1% repurchase shares over the period. Non-CAC40 SRD 
companies fall between these two profiles with 59.5% that repurchase shares, and 31.6% that 
adopt a program but do not implement it.  
  Finally, we collect the dates of annual and quarterly results announcements for the 352 
companies with at least one repurchase over the period 2000-2002. Our source is the 
Europresse database, which contains all dispatches by Agence France Presse and archives for 
all of France’s main daily newspapers, including the two major business dailies, La Tribune 
and Les Echos. We confirm 1,186 announcement dates. These data are used to verify whether  
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firms comply with the ban on share repurchases in the two weeks preceding earnings 
announcements.  
4.  An analysis of whether repurchases comply with their program terms and the 
regulations 
A French company can only repurchase its own shares once a registration statement has 
been approved by the AMF, stating the terms authorized at the shareholders’ meeting. We 
verify that actual repurchases match the content of the registration statement, and examine 
compliance with regulations on volumes and non-trading periods related to possession of 
information not yet in the public domain.  
4.1.Compliance with the content of the registration statement 
The registration statement sets forth: 
-  the objectives of the repurchase program 
-  the date of the shareholders’ meeting that approved the program 
-  the maximum purchase price
7 
-  the maximum percentage of capital that can be repurchased 
-  the duration of the authorization 
-  the practical conditions of the repurchase (whether or not block purchases are 
allowed) 
-  how the repurchase will be financed (debt or equity financing)  
-  whether or not the main shareholders intend to participate in the stock repurchase 
or not 
 
We examine whether the repurchases comply with the authorized programs on two 
points: the maximum percentage capital allowed for repurchases, and the maximum 
repurchase price. The other points in the registration statement either correspond 
mechanically (for example the date of the shareholders’ meeting or the duration of the 
authorization), or are difficult to verify against public data (for example the fact that a major 
shareholder participates in share repurchase, or the financing method).   
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Table 4, panel A, shows the percentage of capital the firm is authorized to repurchase 
under the approved program, and the percentage of actual repurchases associated with that 
program. The authorized limit is typically 10% of the capital, which is the maximum allowed 
by law. On average, the programs set the repurchase limit at 9.13% of capital. This percentage 
is similar for both markets, amounting to 9.71% for CAC40 companies and 8.97% for cash-
only market companies. The program also stipulates the probable percentage repurchased, 
excluding treasury stock (French firms are prohibited from holding more than 10% of their 
own shares). The average (median) percent repurchased is 7.02% (7.83%). These authorized 
repurchase percentages represent a ceiling which firms rarely reach. Average (median) 
repurchases are 19.48% (7.11%) of the authorized percentage capital. Turning to the 
authorized repurchase value, i.e. the number of shares the firm is authorized to repurchase 
multiplied by the maximum purchase price, actual repurchases represent an average (median) 
8.86% (3.34%) of the authorized amount. This smaller proportion in value terms is due to the 
maximum purchase price being generally fixed well above the market price, and the fact that 
the market was generally declining over the period of our study.  
In 17 cases the authorized repurchase percentages were exceeded. Most of these programs 
(12) involved the smallest cash-only market companies, and only 2 were CAC40 companies. 
All “excess” purchases were by companies whose program authorized repurchase of only 
4.38% of total shares, on average, which is well below the legal 10% limit and the overall 
average across all programs, 9.13%. The average percentage repurchased under these 17 
programs is 258% of the authorized percentage. Again, excess purchases are mainly 
concentrated in the programs of firms listed on the cash-only market (307%), whereas for 
CAC40 companies, the excess is more limited (120% of the authorized percentage). 
Based on this first criterion, we conclude that the vast majority of companies comply with 
the terms of their repurchase program.  
In Table 4, panel B, we analyze the maximum price at which shares can be repurchased 
over the duration of the program. The maximum price stated in the registration document is 
adjusted to correct for the effects of stock splits and rights offerings subsequent to the 
document’s issuance date. The maximum repurchase price is set fairly broadly, corresponding 
to an average of 2.36 times the share price at the date the program is approved, which leaves 
considerable room for share price rises. On average, the lowest (highest) actual repurchase 
price is 0.45 (0.62) times the maximum authorized price.  
For the full sample, 34 programs (4.22% of the total) have at least one repurchase above 
the maximum authorized price, mostly concentrated on the cash-only market (30 cases). In  
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these 34 programs, an “excess price” purchase took place on average within 13.44 days 
(43.37% of repurchase days), again mainly on the cash-only market (15 days involving excess 
price repurchases on average, compared to only one for the two CAC40 companies that 
exceeded their authorized price). This price limit non-compliance occurs in programs where 
the ratio of the maximum authorized price to the share price at the program adoption date is 
significantly lower than the same ratio for companies that comply with the limit (1.59 
compared to 2.39). The frequency of price limit violations rises as companies are more 
restrictive in their program terms.  
Our results indicate that most companies comply with the maximum purchase price 
constraint. However, since the stock market was in decline during the period studied, the price 
constraint was less restrictive than it would have been in a bullish market.  
We conclude that for the above two points the majority of companies respect the criteria 
set forth in the registration statement approved by the AMF when their share repurchase 
program is adopted. The few exceptions mainly involve companies that were more restrictive 
than average in their repurchase authorizations.  
 
Insert table 4 here 
4.2. Compliance with volume regulations 
AMF regulations require that the purpose of companies’ trading in their own shares must 
not be to obstruct normal market operation and mislead third parties. Transactions 
representing up to 25% of the average daily trades through the central order book over a 
reference period prior to the transaction are presumed to be legitimate. Up to December 22, 
2000, this reference period was 5 trading days for SRD shares and 30 trading days for other 
shares. Since December 22, 2000, the period has been shortened to three days for SRD shares 
and 15 days for other shares. The 25% limit does not apply to block trades or transactions 
undertaken on the issuer’s behalf by an investment service provider under a liquidity contract 
in conformity with a code of professional ethics, which companies have been able to employ 
since April 10, 2001. This code requires that the contract must guarantee the intermediary is 
independent of the issuer, identify the operations carried out in execution of the contract, have 
a defined scope and objective, govern exchanges of information between the issuer and the 
intermediary, stipulate how the market is informed of the presence of a liquidity contract, the 
resources allocated, and the names of the contracting parties. Moreover, in France the basis  
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for calculation of the maximum 25% of average daily trades over a reference period includes 
the company’s trades in its own shares. In the U.S., repurchases are not included in the 
reference volume. 
To measure repurchases in excess of the volume limit over the period 2000-2002, we 
identified two non-overlapping periods. The first period is January 1, 2000 to April 10, 2001, 
a period when liquidity contracts did not exist. The second period is April 11, 2001 to 
December 31, 2002, a time span during which companies could enter into a liquidity contract 
which exempted them from the volume limit. Repurchases made under a liquidity contract are 
declared in the same way as other repurchases, and are therefore included in our database. We 
distinguish between companies with, and without, a liquidity contract.  
For each trading day, we calculate the reference volume, including only capital traded 
through the central order book, as prescribed in the regulations. Transactions through the 
block trade facility are excluded in calculating both the reference volume and the 25% limit 
for repurchases. However, the declared repurchases include block trades, which are not 
identified as such in the database. Firms’ repurchase declarations draw no distinction between 
repurchases through the central order book and repurchases through the block trade facility. 
Trades of more than the normal block amount (NBA)
8 defined by Euronext can either be 
executed through the central order book or the block trade facility. Most transactions, even 
very large trades, are executed through the central order book rather than block trading 
facilities. Trades on the specific block trade facility (ACT system) represent on average only 
11.77% of the trades through the central order book (NSC system) over the period 2000-2002. 
To avoid overestimating non-compliance with the 25% rule, we calculate several ratios, 
to infer the portion of repurchases executed through the central order book. 
- First, we assume that all repurchases are carried out through the central order book, 
overestimating the portion of repurchases that are central order book transactions. This 
repurchase/reference volume ratio provides an approximation by excess of the 
repurchase/reference volume ratio.  
- Second, we assume maximum execution through the block trade facility. Repurchases 
through the central order book correspond to the total repurchases for shares not eligible for 
block trades, or when the repurchase volume in one trading day is lower than the NBA. When 
block trades are observed in a day, we consider that they are repurchase transactions and that 
only repurchases in excess of block trades are executed through the central order book. This 
calculation underestimates the portion of repurchases made through the central order book 
and any non-compliance with the 25% rule.  
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These two ratios frame the true repurchase/reference volume ratio for trades through the 
central order book.  
Table 5 provides information about the values of repurchases, trade volumes through the 
central order book and the block trade facility, reference volumes and ratios regarding volume 
rule non-compliance for the whole sample and various subsamples, with distinctions by 
period and according to the presence of a liquidity contract.  
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
The repurchase/reference volume ratio based on the assumption that all repurchases are 
executed through the central order book (maximum volume ratio) is on average 63.52%. The 
repurchase/reference volume ratio based on the assumption that a maximum of repurchases 
are carried out through the block trade facility (minimum volume ratio) is on average 8.75% 
for the whole sample. We base our assessment of compliance with the 25% rule using the 
minimum volume ratio, which is an approximate minimum estimate of the true ratio. Using 
this low estimate, the 25% volume rule was violated on 8,147 trading days (23% of the total). 
The distribution by market shows that the firms with the most non-compliance with the 
volume rule are the smallest and least liquid firms. For firms listed on the cash-only market, 
27.11% of repurchase days violate the volume rule, while for CAC40 (other SRD) companies, 
only 1.82% (13.81%) of days violate the rule. Non-compliance with the volume rule does not 
appear to be concentrated in a small number of firms, given that 78.81% of firms do not 
comply with this rule on at least one repurchase day (52.77% for CAC40 companies, 74.50% 
for other SRD companies and 90.03% of firms listed on the cash-only market). But whereas 
cash-only and non-CAC40 SRD firms are broadly represented (84.19% and 62.74% 
respectively), only 13.89% of CAC40 firms represent more than 5% of volume rule 
violations. Thus, non-compliance rate for this rule is high, with only few companies showing 
full compliance, all the more so as the actual non-compliance rate is higher than the minimum 
ratio used for our calculations. 
Companies that have a liquidity contract with an investment service provider are exempt 
from the 25% volume rule and trading by the service provider is presumed to be legitimate. 
To verify that the excess trades observed do not result from the existence of a liquidity 
contract, we divide our sample into two periods (before and after liquidity contracts were 
authorized), and in the second period, into firms with and without a liquidity contract. In the 
period covered by our study, no CAC40 company had entered into a liquidity contract. We  
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observe that firms with a liquidity contract break the volume rule less frequently. The non-
compliant firms represent 18.15% of firms listed on the cash-only market with a liquidity 
contract (compared to 30.38% over the same period for firms with no liquidity contract). For 
non-CAC40 SRD firms, the ratio is 8.69% with a liquidity contract against 13.20% without. 
On average, repurchases executed under liquidity contracts are smaller in scale, as their 
objective is not to accumulate shares. For cash-only market companies, the average total value 
of shares repurchased on one repurchase day is €7,187 with a liquidity contract compared to 
€23,336 over the same period without a contract; for SRD companies, €18,393 and €180,778 
respectively. However, the volumes traded by companies with a liquidity contract are also 
small, particularly for SRD firms, measures that the least liquid companies are the most likely 
to enter into a liquidity contract. Thus, although companies with a liquidity contract are 
exempt from the volume constraint, they comply with it in proportionately greater numbers. 
Our results are robust and provide an approximate minimum estimate of non-compliance 
rates. These results can be compared to the findings of Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003), who 
report that 40.74% of the firms in their sample exceed the legal volume on at least one 
occasion. The frequency of violation is higher on the Nasdaq than on the NYSE. On the 
NYSE, violations represent 14% of allowed volume whereas on the Nasdaq, firms repurchase 
57% more than the allowed non-block volume for a day. Although the Cook, Krigman and 
Leach’s (2003) results are based on a questionnaire that was answered on a voluntary basis, 
they find that the non-compliance rate is high. Using data from the French market, we show 
that the non-compliance rate is considerably higher than their estimate.  
4.3. Repurchases around annual earnings results announcements 
U.S. regulations on share repurchases stipulate that once private information exists, 
including the annual results, the company has a choice between disclosing or abstaining from 
repurchasing. French regulations are stricter regarding earnings results announcements, since 
an issuer must, without exception, abstain from trading its own shares during the 15 calendar 
days prior to publication of its consolidated financial statements, or annual accounts, and 
more generally, as in the U.S., as soon as it is in possession of insider information. We are 
particularly interested in this 15-day period prior to results announcements, which we call the 
“non-trading window”. The E.U. regulations of 2004 extend the ban on trading before results 
announcements to interim accounts, which were already concerned by the extension 
concerning possession of insider information. The AMF relaxed the rule, making it  
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inapplicable to trading activity on behalf of the issuer under a liquidity contract. Over the 
period of our study, we examine all the publication dates for annual, half-yearly and quarterly 
results. As in the analysis of compliance with the volume rule, the existence of a liquidity 
contract must be taken into account, as it generates a presumption of legitimacy for trades by 
intermediaries during the non-trading windows.  
Over our sample period, 1,186 result announcement dates are available for companies 
that made at least one repurchase. Only dates falling between the first and last date (plus 15 
days) of the repurchase program are selected in establishing this total. As our database on 
actual repurchases includes repurchases up to the end of 2002, announcements of 2002 annual 
results made in 2003 are not taken into account. This explains why the number of annual 
results announcements in our sample is lower than the number of half-yearly results 
announcements.  
Table 6, panel A, shows the results for all years over the full sample, then by market type 
(CAC40 shares, non-CAC40 SRD shares, and cash-only shares). The first category, “no 
announcement date available”, covers firms for which there is no public report of the 
publication date. The second category, “no repurchase during non-trading windows”, covers 
firms whose publication dates are available, but with no repurchase detected during the 15-
day periods prior to those dates. The third category covers firms for which at least one 
repurchase took place during a non-trading window. 
There are 352 firms which were subject to at least one repurchase between 2000 and the 
end of 2002. The number of observations would be higher than 352 when some companies 
transfer to a different market. For 50 companies, no announcement date is available. For 306 
companies (86%) with at least one repurchase during the period, an announcement date is 
available. Of the firms with at least one announcement date available, 90 never repurchased 
shares during a non-trading window. Finally, 216 companies carried out at least one 
repurchase during a non-trading window. For each case, we calculate the number of 
repurchase days and the value of repurchases made during non-trading windows.  
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
The percentage of repurchase days that violate the non-trading window is 5.64% for the 
total sample, and 3.60%, 4.50% and 6.28% for CAC40 companies, non-CAC40 SRD 
companies, and cash-only market companies, respectively. Firms repurchase shares, on 
average, in 7.62 days within a non-trading window (4.44 for CAC40 companies, 5.27 for non- 
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CAC40 SRD and 8.93 for cash-only market companies). The average number of repurchase 
days during non-trading windows per results announcement is 3.61 for the full sample, 1.76 
for CAC40 companies and 2.63 (4.33) for non-CAC40 SRD (cash-only market) companies. 
Although in terms of the number of repurchase days, the least liquid firms are the most 
frequent non-trading window violators, their violations involve smaller amounts. The scale of 
repurchases during non-trading windows as a proportion of total repurchases is higher when 
the firm is listed on a more liquid market. For the full sample, the value repurchased during a 
non-trading window is 6% of the total value repurchased, but 6.20% for CAC40 shares, 
4.12% for non-CAC40 SRD shares and 2.48% for cash-only market shares. Repurchases 
during non-trading windows are mainly concentrated close to the announcement date, 
particularly for companies listed on the most liquid markets. Taking repurchases carried out 
during the three trading days preceding the result publication date, non-compliant purchases 
represent 3.22% of total repurchases, and 53.65% of all non-compliant repurchases. For 
CAC40 companies they total 3.38% (54.58% of non-compliant repurchases), while for cash-
only market companies the figure is 0.65% (26.10% of non-compliant repurchases). 
While the SEC authorized U.S. firms to repurchase their own shares after September 11, 
2001, granting a presumption of legitimacy, there was no equivalent measure for French 
companies. Nevertheless, when we examine the repurchases in the period from September 11 
to October 15, 2001 (Table 6, panel B), the violations observed are larger in scale during this 
period, particularly for CAC40 companies. There were 15.69% of repurchase days in that 
period that were within a non-trading window (11.28% for CAC40 companies, 18.77% for 
non-CAC40 SRD companies and 5.51% for cash-only market companies). The impact in 
value terms is amplified, given that 21.31% of the total amount repurchased during the post-
September 11 period was repurchased during a non-trading window (21.31% for CAC40 
companies, 21.99% for non-CAC40 SRD companies and 10.47% for cash-only market 
companies). During the post-September 11, 2001 period, 42.40% of the total amount 
repurchased in violation of the non-trading window rule for 2000-2002 occurred. This result 
occurs primarily for CAC40 companies (43.97%), whereas the September 2001 effect 
concerns only 13.54% (21.21%) of amounts repurchased by non-CAC40 SRD companies 
(cash-only market companies). 
In Table 6, panel C, we take into account the impact of the existence of a liquidity 
contract. A company that engages an investment services provider to manage its repurchases 
under a liquidity contract is exempt from the ban on trading in the period before annual results 
announcements. We verify that the previous results do not primarily stem from the existence  
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of liquidity contracts, by identifying a first period unaffected by liquidity contracts, from 
January 1, 2000 to April 10, 2001, and a second period running from April 11, 2001 to 
December 31, 2002. We split the sample between firms that entered into a liquidity contract 
during the period and firms that did not. We show that our previous results are robust. Across 
the full sample, 5.41% of repurchase days were during the non-trading windows prior to the 
introduction of liquidity contracts. After their introduction, this proportion rises to 7.37% for 
firms without a liquidity contract and 10.45% for firms with a liquidity contract. These results 
are largely attributable to firms listed on the cash-only market, where the existence of a 
liquidity contract results in 10.93% of repurchases taking place during non-trading windows 
(7.70% of the total value of repurchases) compared to 8.63% of repurchase days (3.64% of 
the value) over the same period when there was no liquidity contract. Although liquidity 
contracts bring about an increase in repurchases during non-trading windows for cash-only 
market companies, this factor alone cannot explain all of our results regarding violation of the 
non-trading windows. We conclude that a certain number of firms that are required to abstain 
from trading prior to results announcement in fact violate the non-trading window. 
 
Finally, we divide the sample according to the type of results announced: quarterly, half-
yearly, or annual (Table 6, panel D). French companies are only required to publish annual 
results, but an increasing number are choosing to publish half-yearly results, and some, 
particularly the largest companies, also publish quarterly results. We analyze announcements 
for all quarters from 2000 to 2002. Of the 1,186 announcements, there are 129 announcements 
of quarterly results (34 for CAC40 companies, 61 for non-CAC40 SRD companies and 34 for 
cash-only market companies), 595 announcements of half-yearly results (93 for CAC40 
companies, 157 for non-CAC40 SRD companies and 345 for cash-only market companies) 
and 462 announcements of annual results (66 for CAC40 companies, 126 for non-CAC40 
SRD companies and 270 for cash-only market companies). For the full sample, the average 
number of repurchase days during a non-trading window is 3.61, with 1.76 for CAC40 
companies, but 4.3 for cash-only companies. There are also variations in the non-compliance 
rate according to the type of results announced, particularly for CAC40 companies, for which 
the number of days of non-compliance per announcement is 2.16 (1.44) for half-yearly 
(quarterly) results announcements and 1.31 for annual results announcements. The fact that 
French regulations explicitly prohibit share repurchases during the 15 days prior to the annual 
results announcements, while the regulations on interim results announcements are 
encompassed in insider trading rules, may explain this difference. Whatever the explanation,  
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the number of violations observed over the period is far from negligible and we can affirm 
non compliance with the non-trading window rule.  
5.  Non-compliance with regulations and market liquidity   
We examine the issue of whether non-compliance with repurchase regulations leads to a 
deterioration in liquidity for the relevant firm, and higher costs for investors, or whether the 
impact is neutral. We compare several liquidity measures for compliant repurchase days and 
non-compliant repurchase days, separating violations of the volume rule from violations of 
the non-trading window rule.  
Table 7 reports summary statistics for a range of liquidity measures, divided into trade-
based measures and order-based measures for trading days with and without repurchases. 
Trade-based measures include the number of trades and the turnover ratio, i.e. the ratio 
between the capital exchanged during the session and the market capitalization at opening. 
Order-based measures include effective relative bid-ask spreads and depths. Depth at opening 
is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of the value in Euros of shares posted at the 
best limits first observed in the order book that trading day. The bid-ask spread at opening is 
calculated based on the first price and the first spread available for the session immediately 
after the first price which is an auction price. We also report the average relative effective 
spread, estimated using full day data records. In this case, the number of spreads over a 
trading day varies according to the number of transactions. The effective spread takes into 
account the possibility of a transaction within the spread, although in practice this is rare on 
the Paris stock exchange.




Midpoint - Price   Trade 2










 Insert Table 7 here 
The results differ according to the share’s market and the type of non-compliance. For 
CAC40 companies, whose non-compliance rate is low, neither the turnover ratio nor the  
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number of transactions, nor volatility are affected by repurchases in excess of the authorized 
volume. Depth and spread at opening (calculated based on the day’s first prices after the 
opening auction) are not significantly different between volume compliance and volume non-
compliance. The only indicator of any deterioration in liquidity is the relative spread 
calculated based on the full day’s data record, which rises on average from 0.00172 to 
0.00204. Days of non-compliance with the non-trading window by CAC40 companies display 
a higher turnover ratio and number of transactions. But neither depth nor the bid-ask spread 
are adversely affected by violations of the non-trading window rule.  
For non-CAC40 SRD companies, whose violation rate, particularly on volume rules, is 
higher than CAC40 firm rates, no deterioration can be detected in the liquidity indicators, 
whether depth or spread. 
However, the results are different for cash-only market firms. The depth is lower, and the 
spread by any measure increases when the volume rule is broken. The average spread (based 
on the full day’s data record) increases from 0.02589 to 0.0309. Non-compliance with non-
trading windows leads to a deterioration in the spread (by any measure), but not in depth.  
To verify the robustness of our results, we studied liquidity with reference to the existence 
or non-existence of a liquidity contract and find that results are the same. A liquidity contract 
does not affect the impact on liquidity of non-compliance with regulations. We also used a 
multiple regression to verify that our results were not related to volatility fluctuations or other 
characteristics of the trading day. The multiple regressions confirm that liquidity deterioration 
essentially concerns firms listed on the cash-only market and is more sensitive for the volume 
rule, independent of the other characteristics of the trading day.
11  
Thus, we conclude that the liquidity on days when firms do not comply with the share 
repurchase regulations is clearly reduced for cash-only market companies, whose liquidity is 
low, but liquidity is not greatly affected for more liquid companies.  
6.  Conclusion 
Although the regulations governing stock repurchases in France are similar to those 
applicable in the U.S., detected verification of compliance with French regulations is made 
possible through access to detailed data on the repurchases actually made. We study a large 
sample of actual share repurchases in France by obtaining access to a private database. We are  
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thus able to carry out detailed verifications of compliance with the repurchase regulations 
using actual data rather than only survey data. 
We verify that the repurchases complied with the program terms as defined by the 
shareholders’ meeting that authorized the repurchases, comparing the percentage of capital 
repurchased with the authorized percentage, and the repurchase price with the maximum 
authorized price. We show that most firms comply with the specifications of their programs, 
in large part because they generally set very broad limits. For instance, the authorized 
buyback percentage is often set at the legal maximum, even when the firm’s objective is well 
below that level. Similarly, the maximum repurchase price is often fixed at a high level that is 
easy to meet.  
We also study compliance with the daily repurchase volume regulations (repurchases 
must remain below 25% of the reference volume for a given day) and the ban on repurchasing 
stock just before results announcements (no repurchases may take place during the 15 days 
preceding publication of results). While most repurchases follow these rules, few firms are in 
total compliance. We find that 79% of firms violate the volume rule in at least one repurchase 
day, and the violations concern 23% of repurchase days. Moreover, 70% of firms have 
repurchased shares during a non-trading window at least once, and this concerns 5.5% of 
trading days. We conclude that firms are not in compliance with regulations governing share 
repurchases, particularly the smallest and least liquid firms. 
Finally, we study the impact on market liquidity of non-compliance with the regulations. 
Non-compliance systematically leads to a perceptible deterioration in liquidity for firms listed 
on the cash-only market, which are the least liquid. But the impact is less clear, and is likely 
to be neutral for repurchases during non-trading windows, for firms listed on the most liquid 
market segments.  
Overall, firms are not in compliance with French regulations on open market repurchases. 
The least liquid firms, which show the highest non-compliance rates, are also the firms that 
see the liquidity of their share’s market deteriorate following a violation of the rules. Firms 
listed on more liquid markets display a greater degree of compliance, and their non-
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Table 1. Main characteristics of repurchase regulations in France and the U.S. 
  France  U.S. until end of 2003  U.S. from 2004 
Broker or dealer  One broker or dealer on any 
given day 
One broker or dealer on any 
given day 
One broker or dealer on any 
given day - issuers can make 
repurchases through an ECN 
Time of purchases  No purchase may constitute the 
opening or closing transaction 
of the current trading day. 
No purchase may constitute 
the opening transaction. No 
purchase may occur in the 30 
minutes before the end of the 
trading day. 
 
No purchase may constitute 
the opening transaction. 
Issuers of more liquid 
securities may not purchase 
their securities during the last 
ten minutes. Issuers of all 
other eligible securities may 
not purchase their securities 
during the last 30 minutes. 
Price of purchases  The purchase price must fall 
within the lowest-highest price 
interval for the elapsed portion 
of the trading day. 
Price limitations vary 
depending on whether the 
security is a "reported," 
"exchange-traded," "Nasdaq," 
or "other” security, and 
whether the bid or purchase is 
effected on an exchange. 
The purchase price must not 
exceed the highest 
independent bid or the last 
independent transaction price, 
whichever is higher, quoted or 
reported in the consolidated 
system. 
Volume   25% of the security's trading 
volume (block transactions are 
excluded)  
25% of the security's trading 
volume (block transactions are 
excluded). 
25% of the security's trading 
volume (block transactions are 
included). An amended block 
exception allows issuers to 
make one block purchase per 
week, provided that the issuer 
does not make any other Rule 
10b-18 purchases on that day.  
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Trading volume reference 
period 
Depending on the market and 
the period (from 3 days to 30 
days before the repurchase day).
Four calendar weeks 
preceding the repurchase day. 
Four calendar weeks 
preceding the repurchase day. 
Abstention period  15 days before results 
announcements or if in 
possession of non-public 
information. 
If in possession of non-public 
information, choice of 
disclosing or abstaining from 
repurchasing.  
If in possession of non-public 
information, choice of 
disclosing or abstaining from 
repurchasing. 
Disclosure  For a given month, at the 
beginning of the following 
month. 
No disclosure required.  For a given quarter, at the 
beginning of the following 
quarter, disclosing figures for 




Table 2. Characteristics of open market share repurchase programs 
This table comprises descriptive statistics for 1,578 open market share repurchase programs adopted between July 1998 and 
December 2002 in France. The sample is broken down into three subgroups according to settlement method (cash-only or 
deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index  for deferred settlement companies. 
 






Total number of programs adopted  
(= all programs) 
1,578 147  365 1,066 
Number of active programs = programs with 
at least one actual repurchase (as % of total 









Value of shares repurchased over the sample 
period (€ million) 













Number of programs by year of adoption  
(% active programs) 
 









































Average authorized (actual) length of the 
programs, in months 
17.6 (14.14)  17.6 (13.5)  17.6 (14.6)  17.6 (15.0) 
Motives for the repurchase program 
Primary objective - number of programs 
Price stabilization 
as % of total number of programs 
Active programs  as % of total number of 
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Active programs  as % of total number of 













ESOP and stock options 
as % of total number of programs 
Active programs  as % of total number of 
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Active programs  as % of total number of 
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Active programs  as % of total number of 
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Active programs  as % of total number of 












Primary objective - Value of shares repurchased per objective, in € million and as % of the total value of shares repurchased 
Price stabilization  15,565  46.08% 13,317 44.24% 1,748  60.19%  498  64.84%
Cancellation 5,718  16.93% 5,318  17.67% 317  10.92%  83  10.81%
ESOP and stock options  6,230  18.44% 5,639  18.73% 509  17.53%  82  10.68%
Exchange 6,042  17.89% 5,692  18.91% 266  9.16%  84  10.94%
Treasury stocks  138  0.41% 137  0.46% 0  0.00%  1  0.13%
Other 84  0.25% 0  0.00% 64  2.20% 20  2.60%
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Table 3. Characteristics of repurchasing firms 
This table contains all the shares and similar securities listed in Paris on the regulated Euronext markets between January 2000 and December 2002, including those 
newly listed or delisted during the period. Shares for which no repurchase program was adopted are classified under "No repurchase program". Those for which a repurchase 
program was adopted, but no repurchase occurred over the period are classified under “inactive repurchase program”, while those for which there was at least one repurchase 
transaction are classified under "Repurchase". The averages of all daily observations are shown in the table. The total number of shares is 924. The number of observations 
(column N) corresponds to the number of firm-trading days available. The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-
inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies. The last columns provide parametric and non parametric tests to compare firms which have repurchased at 
least once and, respectively, those with no repurchase program and those which adopted a program, but made no repurchases.  






















Value Weighted Average Price (central order book), 
(in €) 












Depth (central order book daily average at opening 
in €) 








Volatility (average annualized hourly estimation)  117.10% 87.93% 46,434 103.47
% 




















Breakdown of the number of shares by market model 
A share may change categories during 2000-2002, and in such cases it is counted more than once, which explains the higher number of shares in the 
breakdown by market model. 
Total number of 
shares 
Total number of shares  308  305  436  1,049 
Number of CAC40 index shares in each category (in 
% of total number of CAC40 index shares) 
2 (4.3%) 6 (13%) 38 (82.6%) 46 
Number of deferred settlement facilities (SRD) 
shares in each category (in % of total number of 
SRD shares) 
17 (8.9%) 60 (31.6%) 113 (59.5%) 190 
Number of cash-only market shares in each category 
(in % of total number of cash-only market shares) 
289 (35.5%) 239 (29.4%) 285 (35.1%) 813 
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Table 4. Compliance with the terms of the program registration statement 
 
This table contains a detailed analysis of the compliance with the rules stipulated in the registration statement 
authorizing the repurchase program, for the 806 programs which saw at least one actual repurchase over the 
period 2000-2002 (active programs). Two constraints are taken into account: the maximum percentage of capital 
the firm is authorized to repurchase, and the maximum repurchase price allowed. 
 









Panel A. Respect of the maximum percentage of capital  
Number of programs with at least one 
actual repurchase (= active programs) 
806 93  191  522 
Mean (median) authorized % of 
repurchased capital 




Mean (median) probable % of 
repurchased capital 
7.02% (7.83%)  7.02% (7.5%) 7.33% (8%)  6.90% 
(7.80%) 
Mean (median) portion of the announced 
















Mean (median) % of the announced 
value actually repurchased 






Number of programs (%)  for which 
actual repurchases exceeded the 
authorized % repurchase 
17 (2.11%)  2 (2.15%)  3 (1.57%)  12 (2.30%) 
For programs where the maximum authorized % is exceeded 








Mean (median) portion of the announced 










Panel B. Respect of the maximum repurchase price  
 
Mean (median) maximum repurchase 
price fixed in the registration statement / 
price at the program adoption date  
2.36 (1.77)  1.55 (1.49)  1.97 (1.67)  2.61 (1.93) 
Mean (median) actual minimum 
repurchase price / price fixed in the 
registration statement  
0.45 (0.45)  0.54 (0.57)  0.47 (0.49)  0.43 (0.40) 
Mean (median) actual maximum 
repurchase price / price fixed in the 
registration statement  
0.62 (0.62)  0.72 (0.73)  0.67 (0.66)  0.61 (0.58) 
Number of programs where the 
maximum authorized price was exceeded 
34 (4.22%)  2 (2.15%)  2 (1.05%)  30 (5.75%) 
For programs where the maximum authorized price is exceeded at least once  
Average number of repurchase days (as 
% of the number of repurchase days for a 
program) when the maximum authorized 









Mean (median) maximum repurchase 
price fixed in the registration statement / 
price at the program adoption date 
1.59 (1.12)  1.13 (1.13)  1.21 (1.21)  1.64 (1.12)  
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Table 5. Volume rule compliance 
The sample consists of 352 firms listed on the Paris market which repurchased their own shares during at least one trading day between January 2000 and December 2002. 
The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement (SRD)) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement shares. 
For each subsample, we distinguish between the periods before and after April 10, 2001 (when the use of liquidity contracts was authorized). For the second period, we split 
our subsample further to separate firms with and without a liquidity contract. 
 
 Total  sample, 
over 2000-
2002 
CAC40 shares  Non-CAC SRD shares   Cash-only market 













































 Volume  statistics 
Value of shares 
repurchased over the 
sample period (€ million) 
33,776 10,880  19,263  1,444 1,521  39  309  291  39 
Total number of repurchase 
days 
35,420  1,394 1,954  3,356 3,394  725  8,068  12,464  5,490 
Average (median) daily 
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Average (median) euro value 
of shares repurchased by a 
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  Volume condition compliance 
























































Number (%) of trading days 
not in compliance according to 
minimum ratio 
8,147 (23%) 
61 (1.82%)  1032 (13.81%)  7054 (27.11%) 
Percentage of firms with at 
least one volume rule  
violation based on minimum 
ratio  
78.81% 52.77%  74.50%  90.03% 
Percentage of firms with more 
than 5% of non-compliant 
repurchase days based on 
minimum ratio 




Table 6: Repurchases during non-trading windows  
The sample consists of 352 firms listed on the Paris market which repurchased their own shares during at least one 
trading day between January 2000 and December 2002. The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or 
deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement shares. The sum of the 
number of shares in the three subpanels is higher than 352 because some shares changed market type during the period.  
The non-trading window is the 15 calendar days prior to the result publication date. 1,186 dates of results 
announcements have been analyzed. Panel A shows the results for the total sample. The first category, “no 
announcement date available” covers firms for which no result publication date could be found in the press. The second 
category, “no repurchase during non-trading windows”, covers firms whose result announcement dates are available, 
but for which no repurchase was detected during the 15-day periods prior to those dates. The third category covers firms 
for which at least one repurchase took place during a non-trading window. 
Panel B shows the results for the period between September 11 and October 15, 2001. Panel C shows the results 
according to the existence of a liquidity contract. Panel D shows the results by type of financial results announced 
(annual, half-yearly, quarterly). 
 




Panel A. Analysis of repurchases during non-trading windows  
No announcement date available 
Number of issuers  50  2  4  44 
Number of repurchase days  3,683  110  427  3 146 
Total value repurchased (€ million)  410  267  35  108 
No repurchase during non-trading windows 
Number of issuers  90  8  25  57 
Number of results announcements  730  130  246  354 
Number of repurchase days  3,228  154  589  2 485 
Total value repurchased (€ million)  1,600  858  615  127 
Repurchases during non-trading windows 
Number of issuers  216  25  49  142 
Number of results announcements  456  63  98  295 
Number of repurchase days (NbR)  29,154  3,083  5,737  20,334 
Number of repurchase days within non-
trading windows (NbRW)  1,646  111  258  1,277 
Non-compliance rate based on number of 
days (NbRW/NbR)  5.64%  3.60%  4.50%  6.28% 
Number of repurchase days within non-
trading windows per issuer  7.62 4.44  5.27  8.93 
Number of repurchase days within non-
trading windows per results 
announcement   3.61 1.76  2.63  4.33 
Total value repurchased (VTR) 
(€ million)  31,665  29,015  2,243  405 
Value repurchased within non-trading 
windows (VRW) (€ million)  1,901 1,799  92.31  10.04 
Non-compliance rate based on value 
(VRW/VTR) 6.00%  6.20%  4.12%  2.48% 
Value repurchased during the three 
trading days prior to results 
announcement (VR3W) (€ million)  1,020  982  35.80  2.62 
Non-compliance rate during the three 
trading days prior to results 
announcement (VR3W/VTR)  3.22%  3.38%  1.60%  0.65% 
Portion of violations during the three 
trading days prior to results 
announcement (VR3W/VRW)  53.65%  54.58%  38.78%  26.10%  
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Panel B. Repurchases during non-trading windows between September 11 and October 15, 2001 
Number of repurchase days (NbR)  1600  195  389  1016 
Number of repurchase days within non-
trading windows (NbRW)  251  22  73  156 
Non-compliance rate based on number of 
days  (NbRW/NbR)  15.69%  11.28%  18.77%  5.51% 
Total value repurchased (VTR) 
(€ million)  3,782 3,597  165  20.35 
Value repurchased within non-trading 
windows (VRW) (€ million)  806  791  12.5  2.13 
Non-compliance rate based on value 
(VRW/VTR)  21.31% 21.99%  7.57%  10.47% 
VRW (non-trading windows of September 
2001)/VRW (total non-trading windows)  42.40%  43.97%  13.54%  21.21% 
Panel C. Repurchases during non-trading windows, by period and existence of a liquidity contract 
Before April 10, 2001       
Non-compliance rate based on number of 
days  (NbRW/NbR)  5.41%  4.83%  4.56%  6.02% 
Non-compliance rate based on value 
(VRW/VTR)  8.47% 8.71%  5.76% 4.17% 
After April 10, 2001 
Without liquidity contract         
Non-compliance rate based on number of 
days (NbRW/NbR)  7.37%  4.22%  5.44%  8.63% 
Non-compliance rate based on value 
(VRW/VTR)  6.73% 6.81%  5.86% 3.64% 
After April 10, 2001 
With a liquidity contract         
Non-compliance rate based on number of 
days (NbRW/NbR)  10.45% No  firm  6.93% 10.93% 
Non-compliance rate based on value 
(VRW/VTR) 6.47%  No  firm  4.72%  7.70% 
Panel D. Repurchases during non-trading windows, by type of results announcement 
Total number of results announcements 



















Total number of results announcements 
with non-trading window repurchase  456 63  98  295 
Quarterly (Q1 and Q3)   40  16  15  9 
Half-yearly 260  31  57  172 
Annual 156  16  26  114 
Number of repurchase days within the 
non-trading window  



















Number of repurchase days within the 
non-trading window per results 
announcement 






















Table 7. Regulation compliance and liquidity effects 
 
The sample consists of 352 stocks that were subject to at least one repurchase transaction over the period 2000-2002. In assessing the characteristics of these shares, 
trading days with repurchases in compliance with regulations are separated from trading days with repurchases not in compliance with regulations. Results are presented for 
three subsamples:  CAC40 shares, other SRD shares, for which deferred settlement facilities are available, and cash-only market shares. Turnover is the sum of values for all 
trades through the central order book. The turnover ratio is computed for each day as the ratio of capital exchanged to market capitalization at start of trading. The number of 
transactions is the number reported on the central order book. For each share and each day, daily volatility is estimated based on daily rates of return (opening to opening) for 
the 21 most recent trading days. This estimate is annualized. Hourly volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the 36 closest quarter-hourly rates of return 
(approximately 1 day). The number of rates of return is a measure of trading density. When there are no transaction prices in a day, there are 2 missing rates of return. The 
number of rates of return for the 21 most recent trading days (or alternatively the last 36 hours or the last 36 quarter-hours) thus constitutes an indicator of liquidity.  
Depth is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum in Euros of the value of shares posted at the best limits first observed in the order book that day. The effective 
relative spread is estimated by  
Midpoint
Midpoint - Price   Trade 2









The calculation uses either the first spread, or the average of all spreads available for the trading day.  
The last columns provide parametric and non parametric tests to compare means and medians of trading days with and without repurchase.   
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CAC40 shares 
Volume compliance  Non trading window compliance 
Trading days with repurchase in:  compliance  non- compliance p-values  compliance  non- compliance  p-values 









Turnover ratio (turnover/capitalization)  0.00370 0.00312 0.00453 0.00367 0.1216 0.6983 0.00365 0.00307 0.00560 0.00489 <0.0001  <0.0001 
Number of transactions (daily average)  2548 2068 2463 1778 0.7510 0.2448 2503 2042 3863 3353 <0.0001  <0.0001 
Volatility (annualized) for 21 daily rates of return  0.3787 0.3396 0.3561 0.3096 0.2996 0.3658 0.3778 0.3396 0.3937 0.3273 0.3358  0.4340 
Depth -Log of opening value- (daily average)  11.33 11.34 11.09 11.07 0.2168 0.2449 11.32 11.33 11.44 11.83 0.4222  0.0314 
Relative effective spread -at opening- (daily 
average)  0.00363 0.00244 0.00349 0.00267 0.6913 0.3645 0.00364 0.00244 0.00328 0.00245 0.2166 0.9192 
Average relative effective spread – full day’s data records  0.00172 0.00155 0.00204 0.00188 0.0007 0.0141 0.00173 0.00156 0.00169 0.00155 0.5509 1 
Number of observations  3287  61    3240  108   
Shares with deferred settlement facilities 
Volume compliance  Non trading window compliance 
Trading days with repurchase in:  compliance  non-compliance p-values  compliance non-compliance  p-values 









Turnover ratio (turnover/capitalization)  0.00162 0.00072 0.00236 0.00091 0.0038 <0.0001 0.00172 0.00074 0.00188 0.00084 0.3865  0.1335 
Number of transactions (daily average)  252 126 162 100 <0.0001 <0.0001 237 121 307 154 0.0058  0.0123 
Volatility (annualized) for 21 daily rates of return  0.4338 0.3652 0.3421 0.2889 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.4211 0.3554 0.4216 0.3526 0.9751  0.6175 
Depth -Log of opening value- (daily average)  9.54 9.52 9.52 9.51 0.5444 0.6421 9.53 9.52 9.64 9.63 0.1017  0.3809 
Relative effective spread -at opening- (daily 
average)  0.01137 0.00809 0.01154 0.00853 0.6572 0.0960 0.01139 0.00819 0.01135 0.00793 0.9578 0.2345 
Average relative effective spread – full day’s data records  0.00715 0.0058 0.00734 0.0058 0.3005 0.4982 0.00718 0.00581 0.00725 0.00549 0.8438 0.1346 
Number of observations  6443  1032    7209  266   
Cash-only market 
Volume compliance  Non trading window compliance 
Trading days with repurchase in:  compliance  non- compliance p-values  compliance  non- compliance  p-values 









Turnover ratio (turnover/capitalization)  0.00068 0.00025 0.00086 0.00029 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.00073 0.00026 0.00071 0.00024 0.6214  0.2735 
Number of transactions (daily average)  24.2 13 15.5 8 <0.0001 <0.0001 22 11 19 11 0.0004  0.8126 
Volatility (annualized) for 21 daily rates of return  0.4940 0.4173 0.4257 0.3611 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.4752 0.4027 0.4822 0.4005 0.4213  0.6866 
Depth -Log of opening value- (daily average)  8.77 8.81 8.73 8.79 0.0012 0.0646 8.76 8.81 8.74 8.79 0.5718  0.8857 
Relative effective spread -at opening- (daily 
average)  0.02939 0.02020 0.03369 0.02232 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.03030 0.02060 0.03483 0.02234 0.0008 0.0461 
Average relative effective spread – full day’s data records  0.02586 0.01867 0.0309 0.02186 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.02705 0.01945 0.03149 0.02150 0.0003 <0.0001 






                                                 
1 Bainbridge (2000) provides a comprehensive list of papers that discuss insider trading; one of 
the pioneer studies is by Seyhun (1986). Insider trading is very widespread: according to 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001), there is at least some insider trading on more than 50% of stocks in 
a given year. The insiders generally make positive profits. Jeng, Metrick and Zeckauser (2003) 
find that insider purchases earn abnormal returns of more than 6% per year. Not all insider 
trading is illegal, and offences are not always easily detectable. Meulbroek (1992), in a study of 
183 cases listed by the SEC, shows that the abnormal price movement on an illegal insider 
trading day is 40 to 50% of the subsequent price reaction to the public announcement of the 
inside information. 
2 See Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004), who argue for insider trading that it is sometimes better not 
to have a law than to have a law but not enforce it. 
3 Kim, Varaiya and Schremper (2004) propose a comparison of open market share repurchase 
regulations in the ten largest stock markets around the world: the U.S., Canada, Japan, Hong 
Kong and several European countries. 
4 As of 2004, the disclosure of information concerning repurchases by U.S. companies is basically 
similar to French practices. 
5 The AMF took a firmer stand on this matter than the SEC, which temporarily suspended all 
regulations on share repurchases after September 11, 2001.  
6 Changes to the block trading rules were introduced in April 2003, and all shares are now 
eligible. 
7 The maximum purchase price does not have to be disclosed in the registration statement, but 
since most companies include it and are therefore bound by it, we considered it was useful to 
include in the study.   
8 For the period of our study, the NBA, which is established for each share and revised quarterly, 
corresponds approximately to the quantity of shares in the order book for the five best price 
limits. In both quantity and value, the NBA is highly variable from one share to another. An 
ordinary block could be traded within a price range extended to approximately the weighted 
average price of the five best price limits. 
9 All the tests have also been conducted with quoted spreads.  The results are similar, and thus are 
not reported in the paper. 
10 The level of share prices in Europe is very heterogeneous across stocks, so that spreads in Euros 
are not comparable among firms. We have therefore chosen to present the results with relative 
spreads.  
11 These results are not reported in the article but are available from the authors.  